Posted by
mgraves on Monday, October 02, 2006 10:17:24 PM
Considering I’ve declared Pakistan lost, I suppose I should look at some of the larger ramifications of such a turn of events.
Pakistan has already demonstrated an inability to properly secure its nuclear secrets, when it was ostensibly an ally of the U.S. Consider the AQ Khan case. AQ Khan set up a network where nuclear technology was sold to the highest bidder. Iran, North Korea, and Libya are known to have been buyers of the AQ Khan nuclear bazaar. North Korea continues apace with its nuclear program, supplementing it with a ballistic missile program. Iran continues to jerk around the EU, the UN, the IAEA, and the US about its nuclear program. Libya gave up its nuclear program after the U.S. invasion of Iraq, but considering the U.S. ineffectiveness and continued slide to weakness, Libya will probably restart its nuclear program—this time having diplomatic relations with the U.S.
With the ISI increasingly subverting Musharraf—consider the Waziristan deal; the NWFP deal in the works; ISI’s support for terrorist groups in Kashmir, such as Jaish-e-Mohammed; and the ISI’s sponsorship of the Mumbai train bombings this summer—this is a recipe for disaster. The ISI has ties to terrorists in Kashmir, and the Taliban (the ISI was the original sponsor of the Taliban). The terrorists with whom the ISI breaks bread are of the Islamic fascist bent (the Kashmir Information Network alleges ethnic cleansing in Kashmir). It is not a stretch to consider the ISI more than capable of restarting the AQ Khan network, in order to bring in currency for the country.
The loss of Pakistan will also hinder U.S. ability to conduct fly-overs of Pakistan (unless the U.S. is prepared to start showing some spine, again).
Musharraf has been able to deliver such terrorists as KSM and the killers of Daniel Pearl. The loss of Pakistan would entail losing whatever local support from Pakistan existed.
Musharraf is presumably able to rein in the ISI to a degree, so long as he still maintains control of the military. Considering the brazen actions by the ISI in supporting the Taliban, it’ll get much worse with the fall of Musharraf.
Tempers will again flare over Kashmir, with the ISI in command. India and Pakistan were on the brink of war three years ago: increased support for Kashmiri terrorists may again push these two nuclear powers to the brink, and perhaps over the brink. In such a case, the U.S. would have a duty to support India—being a neutral party between a democracy and a totalitarian, terrorist state is immoral (where else does that ring true?)—likely not militarily, as India should have no problem defeating yet another Pakistani invasion.
All told, nothing good can come from the fall of Pakistan and Musharraf, but at the present rate of decline in the state of affairs in Pakistan, Pakistan may fall without Musharraf falling.