Tension mounts in the Horn of Africa, as the dominant Islamic militia of southern Somalia moved thousands of troops to within 10 miles of Somalia’s border with Ethiopia. Ethiopia has previously dispatched military advisors to assist Somalia’s UN sponsored “government”. Islamist militias have called for a “holy war” against Ethiopia.

The situation in Somalia illustrates the danger of leaving Iraq to the sectarian militias currently disrupting the political process. Somalia is virtually a place in the Hobbesian “state of nature”. Various clans and militias have warred for control of Somalia, carving it into a patchwork of warring territories. The U.S. accuses the Islamic council of sheltering suspects in the 1998 East Africa embassy bombings. It is more than likely that the battles and wars provide training for terrorists. It is more than likely that the disorder in the region provides ideal conditions for the establishment of terrorist training sites.

Do we really wish to create another such site by retreating from Iraq and leaving the present situation, in place, to grow worse and to invite intervention by Iran, Saudi, Arabia, Syria, and Turkey?

Chavez ally leads Ecuadorian presidential balloting, as parts of Latin America continue to reject capitalism.

I’d wager that the election of Rafael Correa will lead to the reversal of Ecuador’s dollarization policy, wherein Ecuador has dropped its currency in favor of the U.S. dollar. Of more immediate concern to the U.S. is the march of capitalism rejection taking hold in Latin America. Evo Morales, Hugo Chavez, the return of Ortega, Obrador’s parallel government, and now, the potential elevation of a Chavez ally in Ecuador, are beginning to look like the head of a trend. This is not to say that Correa is an anti-capitalist in the vein of Chavez or Castro, as Correa has served as the finance minister of Ecuador during the dollarization, but his ties to Chavez are cause for concern.

Oaxaca building set ablaze in protests. Mexico suffers from political problems that extend far beyond the parallel government that Obrador is setting up.

I had the opportunity to witness a microcosm of this July 2005 when I crossed over the border at Laredo and Nuevo Laredo. The entire local police force was suspended, pending background investigations resulting from drug gang warfare involving some members of the local police. The Mexican army was deployed to the area to maintain order. Checkpoints were set up further in country, as well. In the week I was in country, five law enforcement members were murdered in Nuevo Laredo.

Mexico has problems with endemic corruption and lawlessness which feed and exacerbate the poverty and poorly performing economy.

These problems, of course, lead to much of the exodus of Mexico’s youth to the land of opportunity, that is, the U.S. The problem with this exodus, is that the problems of Mexico, from its inability to exploit its natural resources, to its endemic corruption, are intensified because those who have the motivation, youth, and ingenuity necessary to confront and defeat these problems are leaving the county. This condemns those who remain to remain in the cycle of poverty and corruption which hinder this country from achieving its full potential.

In the one party State, Mark Steyn discusses the impact of a party remaining in power and forgetting what it's goals are.  As always, Steyn makes some rather depressing points in a humorous way.  There may also be some disturbing parallels to the so-called center-right party of the U.S.: 

"But a party that's been in power as long as the Grits [liberals] mostly believes in being in government, and when it's not, doesn't find it easy to remember what else it's good for."      

Hopefully--the good LORD willing and the crops don't fail--the so-called center-right party will not forget what it is good for.

Joshua Muravchik writes a defense of neo-conservativism, predicated on the notion that neo-cons are still a source of ideas on the right.  Neo-conservativism serves the interests of the Nation, but in a decidedly long-term view, as opposed to the short-sightedness of "realism". 

John Derbyshire, on the contrary, writes a defense of paleorealism, which is to replace the idealistic view of the neo-cons in the present Administration.  Derbyshire is one of my favorite writers.  The appeal of "bomb them to the stone age" certainly has its merits (ignoring the fact that many of those autocracies are already at the stone age level of development...well, with the notable exception of France), but it seems to be short-sighted.

It appears short-sighted, but that may be because it presents more likely results.  The long view is always difficult, due to the vagaries of humanity and that supposed fiction called "free will".

At the moment I'd say I'm more in the "bomb them to the stone age" camp.  That does not mean that I abandon my support for the Iraq war.  We went into Iraq with the goal of deposing a terrorist supporting dictator and stated that we would create a democracy on the rocky soil of the Near East.  If we leave without doing so, we will embolden those terrorists and dictators who hate us.  We will prove weak and ineffectual, and a broken reed, to our friends and allies.  The realist view requires us to finish the task. 

(The idea of bringing Iran and Syria to the table is so profoundly stupid as to hardly bear comment.  I am not, however, above such comment.  Iran has been at war with us since 1979: when they seized sovereign U.S. territory.  Iran has exported terrorism to the ends of the earth.  Iran has dispatched its intelligence personnel to murder dissenting Iranian ex-pats.  Further, Iran has been actively undermining our endeavor in Iraq: Does one invite a burglar into one's home to assist in dealing with the cockroaches? 

And Syria.  Syria is a terrorist state.  Syria has permitted terrorists to base in its territory.  Syria has supported terrorism.  Syria has engaged in terrorism: first Rafik Hariri and now, Gemayel.  Syria has been actively undermining our endeavor in Iraq.)

Granted, Islam is merely the vehicle chosen by these butchers, but too many people rationalize their behaviors, saying that such butchery is the logical result of Western imperialism. Failure to acknowledge that the intentional, savage targeting of non-combatants is never permissible, results in the mad conclusion that such actions may be just reactions to circumstances.

The problem with such a view is that it leads to a moral leveling. This has been discussed here previously: the idea of moral subservience.

I’ll instead talk a wee about terrorism and terrorists. I’ve done that before also, but not from this perspective.

Terrorists seek power and control: power over other’s thoughts, beliefs, or lives, and control over other’s lives, natural resources, cultural resources, or what-have-you. What is called radical Islam is merely the current manifestation of the ideology used as a vehicle to justify savage butchery endemic in the history of humanity.

For many years, communism was used to justify heinous acts. The Great Cultural Revolution, five and 10 year plans, re-education camps, and on and on were justified on the grounds that they were committed in pursuit of a noble goal: that of worldwide communism (or socialism).

Before that, the French Revolution used liberty and equality as excuses to replace hereditary monarchy with the “will to power”, where leadership was granted those who had the ability (and lack of scruples) necessary to seize leadership. Such an idea naturally led to Napoleon, after Robespierre and gang finished setting themselves up and casting themselves down from the temporal thrones they had set themselves on.

Luther’s teachings were seized by anarchists to launch a revolution aimed at the destruction of the nobility. Perhaps the idea that some men should not be placed above others merely on account of their birth is a noble one, but to seek the goal of a meritocracy through the means of theft and murder is ignoble; Just ends do not justify unjust means.

And that is really the point here: something so mundane as, “the ends do not justify the means”. The problem is that too many people claim this as a guiding principle, but ignore it, in practice. Principles that do not leave the classroom are meaningless. Principles that do not find expression in behavior are hardly principles. That is why hypocrisy is so reprehensible: it is not the failing (because we all fail), but the expressed principle that is blatantly ignored.

I’ve thoroughly gone off the wire here, but I hope you’ll forgive me (if anyone still reads this, considering I’ve been away for a week or better). If I may be permitted to try to tie this all together, I will try…

Let us stipulate, for the sake of argument that Islam is a religion of peace. Let us also assume that terrorists who claim to speak for Islam are not real Muslims. Does this, in any way, take away from the fact that they claim to be Muslims and that they claim to speak for Muslims?

No. Islam is the vehicle chosen. These are people who would seek to kill us and exert control over their neighbors regardless of their ideology. They have an apocalyptic worldview which is a function of narcissism and a will to power. The contrived grievances are merely excuses and rationalizations for the consumption of those who follow, not for those who lead.

What makes Islam desirable as a vehicle used to justify murder?

Many countries with large Muslim populations are governed by oppressive dictatorships whose people’s only means of resistance is through religion. And Islam is the dominant religion. The mosque provides the only place to express dissent from the tyrannies that oppress the people.

Also, Muslims in developed countries are marginalized because many do not assimilate. Again, the only refuge is the mosque. No jobs. No prospects. No future. Not a part of the culture. A retreat to that which is familiar is nearly inevitable. The mosque becomes the symbol of that which is fair and stable and familiar.

The mosque becomes a fertile recruiting ground for those who are able to provide a scapegoat for the ails of the dispossessed.

Also, Muslims make up one fifth of the world’s population, many of whom live in autocracies. Many of those who do not live in autocracies live on the outskirts of democratic societies.

I think I’ve covered about a half dozen topics here, so I’d better stop.

Our enemies have railed relentlessly against the scourge of democracy. The main point of contention is that democracy replaces the will of Allah, with the will of the demos, which serves to elevate the demos to the position of Allah. This is idolatry, in the eyes of our enemies.

Egypt fears backlash from Hussein death.  The story explains that this is because Arab publics often identify with their leaders (tell that to the Iraqis beating the fallen statue of Saddam with their shoes). 

Apparently Arab leaders are unhappy with the precedent that would be set.

That precedent is, of course, that murderous dictators can be held to account for their vicious crimes.  No wonder Mubarak is worried. 

All dictators ought to be worried about such a precedent: dictator toppled; dictator convicted in a trial that abides by the rule of law; dictator convicted; dictator gets his just desserts.

Arab leaders must be upset because they don't like the thought of having to answer to anybody.  That's probably why they go with the "absolute" monarchy, or the "total" dictatorship styles of governance.

The realpolitik of, "He may be a sonofabitch, but at least he's our sonofabitch", led to many logical disconnects in American foreign policy.  Perhaps this may be rectified a little at a time.

Remember our veterans: those of our past, those of our present, and those of our future.  They serve nobly, that America might be America.

"Men sleep peaceably at night because rough men stand ready to do violence on their behalf"--George Orwell. 

As with all human endeavors, war is almost entirely unpredictable.  The variables are impossible to control for.  The greatest variable--human behavior--is in the hands of one's opposition.

Intelligence is vitally important for predicting what enemy responses are possible, and what is most likely, but intelligence cannot tell you what will happen.  Even if one held the opposition battle plans, a rout would cause persons to behave other than was planned.  Plans are little more than educated guesses as to what is most likely to happen under certain circumstances, which may change.  (Notice a great deal of wriggle room in there?  Those who seek definitive answers are likely to be disappointed.)

Colonel Joshua L. Chamberlain was awaiting reinforcement, as he attempted to hold a position vital to the Union defense at Gettysberg.  Out-manned, out-gunned, and with dwindling supplies, Col. Chamberlain ordered the left wing of his command, the 20th Maine, to execute a flanking movement--swinging like a gate--and engage the enemy with fixed bayonets.  The Colonel was able to defend the position by being able to adapt to the circumstances. 

The claim that the plan for battle may have been good, but the plan for peace was bad, is simply ignorant of human nature.  While the administration may have inadequately prepared for the peace, this is something that can only be seen in hindsight.  The aftermath may have been entirely different if the 1st Cav had been able to move through the Sunni triangle, by basing in Turkey. 

The Administration and the battle planners adapted to rapidly changing circumstances on the ground.  U.S. supply ships were sitting off the coast of Turkey, waiting to see if they would be able to unload their supplies.  Some ships did unload and had their stocks confiscated by our putative ally, Turkey.  Troops and supplies had to be rapidly redeployed, so as to allow an invasion before summer.  The war planners wanted to limit the hazards that would be encountered; it is entirely reasonable to attempt to mitigate the effect of heat.  At that time, it was still believed the Saddam had WMD stocks that could be deployed.  Military chem gear is hot in the best of conditions (about 20 degrees for comfort); it must be excruciating under 140 degree heat, while wearing flak vest and other PPE, and carrying field gear.

Could the war have waited until fall? 

Not likely.  If it had, what little resolve behind the invasion would have evaporated.  That was the intent the entire time of Hans Blix, et al.: delay the invasion until the dedication wanes. 

What would have happened then?

The U.S. would have forced no concessions and been discredited among our enemies yet again.  This would have likely caused the immediate failure of the Afghanistan venture.  Saddam would have been lionized yet again, and would be free to continue his support for terrorism, his corruption of UN and European officials, his murder and oppression of his people, and his continued low-level war against U.S. and U.K. war planes. 

The sanctions regime would likely have collapsed under the weight of corruption and indifference.  The sanctions were already showing cracks, and in many cases, the sanctions were simply being ignored.  In other cases, alleged U.S. allies were preparing to exploit Iraq as soon as sanctions failed.

I will now return--not seamlessly--to the issue of adaptability.  Any human enterprise requires adaptability.  Perhaps the war planners and the Administration have not been as adaptable as would be best, but that is the very nature of a large bureaucracy or other large organization.  Just as an aircraft carrier cannot turn on a dime, so also, a large--no matter how well-trained and disciplined--organization cannot immediately adapt and adjust fire.  Individuals may adapt, but it takes a long time for the organization, as a whole, to catch up.

The point behind this post (cleverly hidden, no doubt), is to ask those who seek a "change in course" to explain what change they seek.  Without a strategy, the phrase is as meaningless as a UN resolution.  It is time to stop pretending that criticism, without a counter-strategy or solution offered, is useful.

I believe I discussed previously why "strategic re-deployment" is unwise, at best, and cowardly, at worst, so I don't see a purpose behind rehashing a rebuttal to that weak argument (unless someone asks nicely).  We're there, if one feels a "change in course" is necessary, what ought we do differently in order to achieve victory (declaring defeat and going home is also not an option)?

The admonition to resist not evil is often used as a end-all be-all argument against Christian support of any war.  On its face it seems reasonable: turn the other cheek and whatnot.

I tend to not discuss matters of religion here, not because I am not interested in religion, or its impact on people and politics, but because I see religion as an influence on political life, not its driving force.  Just as the State should not control the Church, neither should the Church control the State.  This is not to say that religious persons should not concern themselves with the affairs of this present world.  Just as some are given to be pastors and teachers, so are others given to be soldiers and magistrates.  Some vocations are secular in their basis, but this does not mean that the person occupying that office must be secular.  We are citizens of of the City of God, but until we enter that city we are pilgrims here, and that seems to me, to require participation in this present life, so long as it is not forbidden expressly (or runs the risk of placing persons of weaker faiths in danger of falling away).  If one retreats from the world, one removes a powerful means of witness from one's toolbox.

Any who.  Resist not evil.  The simplest way to dispute this is to use scripture.  The parable of the Good Samaritan has a man helping his neighbor.  Does anyone suppose that had the Samaritan come upon the man being robbed, while the man was being robbed, the Samaritan would have been religiously obligated to "resist not evil" and permit the robbery to occur, before he could assist the man? 

Likewise, if one comes upon a brother who is hungry, ill-clothed, and homeless, and one says to the man, "Keep fed, warm, and dry, and peace be upon you".  Does this mean anything to the man in need?  If one sees a brother/neighbor in need and does nothing, in order to avoid "resisting not evil", is that an excuse for "nonintervention"?

Show me your works without faith, and I will show you my faith in what I do, declared St. James.

When Elijah came across a widow whose children were to be sold into slavery for a debt, did he keep silent and comfort her?  Did he not rather do something to, one might say, resist evil? 

Do we not see evil inflicted on the people of Darfur, the people of Zimbabwe, the people of North Korea, or the People's Republic of China, or many other places in this temporary world (and its temporary whether or not you believe in God)?  Should we stand by and mouth platitudes, so as to avoid "resisting evil"? 

It is important to keep in mind that the Church is not the State, and vice versa.  The Church cannot force the State to fulfill the duties of the Church, but the Church can support the State when the State behaves in such a way that is in line with the desires of the Church (neither can the State force the Church to perform functions of the State).  When the interests of the Church coincide with the interests of the State, much good can be accomplished.

The question then boils down to whether or not a war is Just.  Is it a war declared by a legitimate State?  Is it a war in response to a Just cause, such as (but not limited to) the defense of the citizens of the State, or allies of the State, against aggression?  Are the intentions of the State, in going to war, Just, i.e. does the State intend to establish a Just Peace?  Does the conduct of the war discriminate between noncombatants and combatants?  Does the conduct of the war involve the notion of proportionality?

If the Christian citizen is able to answer these questions affirmatively, then the Christian citizen ought to have no difficulty in supporting the Just war.  The reverse, obviously, leads to the opposite conclusion.

VDH discusses the memory loss afflicting our political chattering classes.  VDH makes several excellent points, but the following distills the argument for war in Iraq to its essence:

The U.S. Senate and House voted for war in Iraq, not merely because they were deluded about the shared intelligence reports on WMD (though deluded they surely were), but also because of the 22 legitimate casus belli they added just in case. And despite the recent meae culpae, those charges remain as valid today as they were when they were approved: Saddam did try to kill a former American president; the U.N. embargo was violated, as were its inspection protocols; the 1991 accords were often ignored; the genocide of brave Kurds did happen; suicide bombers were being given bounties; terrorists, including those involved into the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, were given sanctuary by Saddam; and on and on.

It is easy to forget those things which tend to rebut our present arguments.  A common affliction at present is to forget the 22 reasons that Congress gave in its Authorization for war in Iraq.  The 22 reasons did not tie Saddam to the heinous acts of 11 September 2001.  The 22 reasons did discuss WMD, but the case for war was not based solely, or even mostly on WMD.

We have now reached past the point of whether or not we ought to have invaded Iraq.  We have gone beyond that point because we've been in Iraq for three years.  The question is now whether or not we ought to stay in Iraq.

Why ought we stay in Iraq?

Firstly, we ought to stay so as to not hand a victory to our jihadist enemies.  If we were to hand a victory to our enemies we would hand a powerful recruiting tool to them.  Terrorist organizations have a pyramid structure.  At the top of that pyramid are the leaders, the motivators, the ideological authorities: UBL, al-Zawahri, Nasrallah.  Below the leaders are the captains, the cadre, the first line leaders and the planners: Ramzi Yousef, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, Ramzi bin-al-Shibh, Abu Abbas, and Yasin.  Beneath the captains are the foot-soldiers, the cannon fodder: Mohammed Atta, Jose Padilla, Richard Reid.  Beneath the foot soldiers are the active supporters: the document experts, the logistical experts, and the like.

At the bottom are the passive supporters.  Far and away, these are greatest in number.  These provide the milieu in which the active terrorists move.  They are unwilling to commit one way or the other.  They do not want to pick the losing side, so they play both sides of the fence.  They are waiting to see which side will prove victorious.

If the U.S. were to hand the jihadists such a victory, the passive supporters would swing to them.  They would become active supporters or worse.

Secondly, we would demonstrate our irresolution to dictators such as Kim, Ahmadinejad, Chavez, and Ortega.  This would embolden them.  We are already demonstrating nearly fatal weakness on the Korean peninsula and in Iran.  We cannot afford to demonstrate yet more weakness.

Thirdly, the Iraqi people we abandoned after the first Gulf War deserve our support in establishing that which they attempted to establish 15 years ago: a nation free from tyranny.  The Kurdish people have established a rudimentary civil society under the protective umbrella of the U.S. and U.K. patrolled no-fly zones.  Religious and ethnic minorities, such as the Assyrian Christians are being murdered and exiled, if we leave with the country still  unstable, they would be completely eliminated.  It would be a genocide that we set in motion by departing.

In 1956, President Eisenhower stood by, while the Red Army brutally put down a Hungarian revolt.

In 1973 the U.S. withdrew from Viet Nam, having declared victory. The U.S. stood idly by in 1975 as North Viet Nam rolled into the South, imposed communism by force, and launched re-education camps.

In 1991, President Bush stood by, while Saddam Hussein brutally put down uprisings that the U.S. had encouraged.

What are the lessons to be taken from these instances?

Our potential friends doubt our ability to be a stalwart ally. Our enemies recognize our failure to follow through on our commitments.

Not a good impression to give, but those who counsel that we depart Afghanistan and Iraq seem to be seeking just such a repeat of some of the more craven mistakes of our past. It may be trite to say, “We broke it, we bought it”, but, if nothing else, this is a reason to remain in Iraq until an elected government in Iraq asks us to leave.

There are other reasons to remain, but this boils down to how we appear, to our enemies, and to our allies. If our allies cannot trust us, we will have no allies, worthy of the name. In 1956, General Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal. Great Britain, France, and Israel prepared to re-take the Canal, but the U.S., with the assistance of the UN, undercut our allies. The number of strikes we have been given by our allies is astounding, but the reverse is likely also true.

It stands to reason, however, that we are reaching a tipping point. We cannot continue to demonstrate a lack of resolve in defending ourselves and our allies. We briefly showed strength in Afghanistan and Iraq, and shook the confidence of Colonel Qaddaf’i and Bashir Assad, among others.

Our present prevaricating is rightly seen as a lack of resolve. Why shouldn’t the President of Iraq hedge his bets by permitting the existence of militias, if prior U.S. action has given him no reason to believe our resolve? Why shouldn’t Ahmadinejad and Mr. Kim call our bluff? Why shouldn’t the PRC and Russia undercut our efforts to rein in Mr. Kim and the mullahs? Why shouldn’t the Sudan expel whatever international observers are left? Why shouldn’t warlords in war-torn Somalia invite foreign jihadists into Somalia?

It is imperative that we demonstrate resolve; that we act or fail to act, without apologizing. We must be willing to act in our interests, in concert with our allies, when our interests coincide with those of our allies. We must be willing to act alone, when our interests are solitary.

Forceful debate is required for this, but disagreement must be intelligent, reasoned, logical, and rational. We cannot disagree merely to disagree, without giving the impression of irresolution. This is a dangerous impression to give. This is an impression that we must overcome, based upon our history, those examples cited previously, as well as examples of Lebanon, Somalia, and elsewhere.

North Korea agrees to return to jerking around U.S. Mr. Kim has agreed to return to the role of lying bluster. The U.S. had taken the role, and had demonstrated itself unsuited to the role, lacking the prerequisite spine.

There is much rejoicing in Foggy Bottom as meaning once again returned to their fantasy world. Negotiating with a short, lying S.O.B., with a goofy haircut has proven so successful in the past—the Agreed Framework, to cite but one example—it is bound to continue its course in an efficient manner, agreeable to WMD-seeking dictators the world over.

Ahmadinejad has mobilized his armies of note-takers, as he prepares to trump Mr. Kim’s latest play. Mr. A has been falling behind on the wager, as of late, but look for Mr. A to pull a rabbit out of his hat. The rabbit will likely take the form of Iranian-backed militias stepping up activity in Iraq…wait, we’re already ignoring that. Well, then the rabbit will take the form of Iran deploying its soldiers to fight alongside terrorists in Iraq and Lebanon…wait, we’ve ignored that as well.

The world will weep.

But all hope is not lost as Japan sets a much needed example for the Western world. Western leaders take note. Japan may just have stumbled upon a strategy for success: follow through on one’s word; punish irresponsible behavior; and take positive action to ameliorate threats to one’s citizens. It’s just so crazy it might work.

And just in time. NATO insists on returning Taliban to power. NATO is trying the strength through weakness strategy that served Vichy France so well. Most NATO countries have permitted their militaries to atrophy to the point where, collectively, they are unable to field a capable army of more than 37,000 troops (from 31 countries). These countries bought the Fukuyama treatise the history had ended, and promptly preemptively surrendered. Michael Yon predicts a spring Taliban offensive , and a NATO force that has proven ineffective to this point, faces a rather dire situation.

The world is an ugly place...especially that Mr. Kim guy and what he has done, and is doing, to his citizens (with assists from the PRC, Russia, and South Korea).  The world will not become less ugly merely by wishing it so, or by talking to it.  Occassionally, it needs to be sent to its room (without TVs, computers, and the like...a room like the one I got sent to, with books and a bed).  Occassionally it needs...oh, dear!...a whipping.

I recently saw a commercial by the September Fund.  The commercial featured several people talking to a bush.  A narrator stated that talking to a bush was not helpful, likewise, talking to President Bush is not helpful, according to the commercial.  The narrator then asks for a change.

A couple things struck me.  First the question about an exit strategy.  Secondly, the fact that President Bush is not on the ballot this year.

Leaving aside the second question and proceeding to the first question.  An exit strategy presupposes defeat.  One needs not "exit" unless one is defeated.  If one seeks an exit strategy, one is saying that we are defeated.  This, of course, requires an interesting definition of defeat.  It requires a definition where the "victors" are killed at will, and are unable hold territory against American and coalition effort.  The "victors" rely upon our irresolution to gain victories and hold and take territory.  The "victors" can only be victorious if we permit it.  The "victors" can only be victorious if we have an exit strategy.

If one is victorious, one leaves when one bloody well wants to, on one's own time table, rather than an arbitrary set of conditions.  We remained in the Philippines for a century after the Spanish-American war.  We still have troops in Japan, 60 years later.  We have troops in Korea 40 years later.  The list goes on.  And notice...all these former enemies are now our allies.

It is time to jettison the idiocy of "exit strategies".  It is time to promote "victory strategies".