Posted by
mgraves on Saturday, August 12, 2006 2:34:39 PM
This is concerned primarily with the Global War on Terror. I don’t like the phrase; as has been pointed out countless times, one cannot fight a tactic. The politically correct notion that we cannot name our adversary for fear of offending someone hinders the proper definition of this war, and therefore, the war itself. If we are unable to determine who our enemies are, how can we defeat them?
Terrorism is the tactic chosen by our adversaries. What is terrorism? Crenshaw defines terrorism by what it is not, guerilla warfare[1] . Fanon and Herman held that only states can be guilty of terrorism[2] . Laquer reports the DOD definition of terrorism[3] as: “the unlawful use, or threatened use, of force or violence against individuals or property to coerce and intimidate governments or societies, often to achieve political, religious, or ideological objectives”. Hoffman spends the first 30 pages of Inside Terrorism (1998) discussing the changing definition of terrorism. Stern defines terrorism[4] as an “act or threat of violence against non-combatants with the objective of exacting revenge, intimidating, or otherwise influencing an audience”. White, in Terrorism: An introduction (1998) gives many different definitions of terrorism[5] .
The common themes of these definitions are:
1) illegitimate force;
2) directed against non-combatants;
3) in the furtherance of control, or a political or ideological goal.
We now have a basic definition with which to work. Each element may be subject to further definition. An example of this is the definition of “non-combatant”. Palestinian terrorist groups hold that all Israeli citizens are legitimate targets because all Israelis serve, or have served, in the military, and Israeli children will grow up to serve in the military. This is not an accurate depiction of Israel’s military service requirements, but that does not matter to those who seek the merest shred of legitimacy to cover themselves with. The US Department of State holds that military members are non-combatants unless there is a declared, recognized state of hostilities. The State Department definition seems to be more just and logical, but this is merely one example of the definitional problems within the definition.
Pyramid structure of terrorist organizations
To return to a point briefly alluded to previously concerning the “danger” of giving offense by identifying our enemy, I will briefly discuss the structure of a terrorist organization.
Terrorist groups have a pyramid structure: very few people at the top, and many people at the bottom. Located at the top are the planners and ideological leaders. Osama bin Ladin and Ramzi bin al-Shihb were both examples, now only OBL is. Burke argues that Al Qaeda consists of roughly two dozen “venture capitalists” in the Tora Bora[6] . These do not typically get their hands dirty. They tend to remain above the fray. They may have graduated to leadership, by clawing their way up the ranks, or by getting their hands dirty and surviving; or, like the Blind Sheikh, they may have provided “moral” guidance and rationalization for acts of terrorism.
Beneath the planners is the cadre, the lieutenants. These are the people who carry out the acts of terrorism. Mohammed Atta and Ramzi Yousef were examples of cadre.
Beneath the cadre are the active supporters. They provide logistical support. They run safe houses and provide money or special skills, such as document forgery.
Lastly, are the passive supporters. These are those who identify with the cause, but who may be uneasy about the tactics. These provide the milieu in which the cadre may move without fear of being turned in to the authorities. The passive supporters may be unwilling to actively support a group that may lose. In other words, they are still invested in the status quo.
Passive supporters
The fear of the politically correct is that by identifying our enemy we will drive the passive supporters into the active camp. Passive supporters are not our allies. At best, they are unwilling to commit. At worst, they are a fifth column that will undermine us.
If we cast off fears of political correctness we can shine light into the corners in which passive supporters hide. We can know who our enemies are, and who our allies are.
Who are our enemies?
Our enemies are people who claim to be Muslims, whether they are or not, I am not qualified to say. Our enemies profess the desire to defeat the West and guarantee the spread of Islam. The West is not guilty of supporting Israel. The West is not guilty of launching the crusades 900 years ago. The West is guilty of success. This success is threatening to our enemies. Our enemies see Western success as decadent, and our enemies fear that their co-religionists may be tempted to emulate our success. This must be stopped at any cost.
How is this potentiality to be stopped? This potentiality is stopped by demonstrating that the West’s apparent success is really weakness and decadence. Our enemies seek to demonstrate to their co-religionists that the way of the West is not the way to success. Only by returning to their version of Islam can success be achieved.
What is the war we are fighting then?
We are fighting a war against a violent Islamist ideology. To refer to our enemies as jihadists may not be theologically accurate, but it is simple, and expresses the idea in a way that is easy to grasp. We are fighting a War on Islamo-facism.
How is this war to be fought?
The war cannot be entirely fought on the battlefield. Then again, no war is. Wars are fought in the trenches, and at tables of diplomats; in dark alleys and souks, and computer-filled rooms. We must be willing to fight wars against supporters of terrorism and the violent Islamist ideology that motivates our enemies. We must be able to use a valid threat of force when we go to the bargaining table. We cannot negotiate merely to negotiate.
[1] The tripartite test proposed by Crenshaw is: guerillas use legitimate military tactics; guerillas attack legitimate military targets; and guerillas have a legitimate chance of success. Terrorists do not meet all of these standards. Guerillas may use, on occasion, terrorist tactics, but these are deviations from their strategy. Terrorists may use guerilla tactics, but they either lack a legitimate chance of success, or terrorism is their overarching strategy, and guerrilla tactics are deviations from that strategy.
[2] Both Fanon and Herman connect terrorism to action of state imperialism.
[3] The new terrorism (1999). Pp 5-6. Oxford University Press.
[4] The ultimate terrorists (1999). Pg. 11. Harvard University Press.
[5] Page nine has a chart covering several different definitions.
[6] Al Qaeda: Casting a shadow of terror (2003). I.B. Tauris and Company, Ltd. Burke argues that Al Qaeda functions as a venture capitalist firm of terrorism: individuals or groups bring terrorism plans to Al Qaeda, which then decides whether or not to fund and support (and to what extent) an act of terror. Affiliated groups are merely successful “start-ups”.